Sunday, December 6, 2015

Israel: Annex Judea and Samaria and Make it Jewish



Israel: Annex Judea and Samaria

and Make it Jewish



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Israel - Promised Land
Ted Belman of Israpundit believes a diplomatic solution for Israel and Arabs that call themselves Palestinians is dead. In other words there is no common ground for a Two-State Solution in which a Jewish State and an Islamic State (i.e. yet another Islamic State in a Middle Eastern sea of Islamic States) will exist side by side.

Belman suggests an Israeli annexation of Judea and Samaria (West Bank to Arabs, Muslims, Europeans and unfortunately America). After all that is exactly the path Jordan took when a British Military Officer led Jordanian army managed to stalemate Israel’s Defense Forces to what known as the pre-1967 border in 1948. The year Israel declared independence for the Land of Israel and fought off five to six invading Arab-Muslim armies to prevail its independence. The Arab-Muslim intention was a second Holocaust of Jews a mere three years after the Hitler-Nazi Holocaust ended.

For some reason Arab and Muslim propaganda has convinced most of the West that Jordan’s unilateral annexation of the Judea and Samaria side of the British Palestine Mandate meant that the land was Jordanian sovereign land. Hence the imposed term of “occupied” land by the West, Arabs, Muslims, Iranian-Shi’ites and Arabs that invented the name of Palestinian.

The irony of stranded Arabs by losing Arab armies that refused to accept the consequences for their invasion is that term “Palestinian” was an inference to Jews prior to 1948. I am certain the Palestine Mandate that became Israel abhorred the name “Palestine” because the term derived from an insulting term created by conquering Romans that had emptied most of the Holy Land of Jews because of constant revolts for independence. Ultimately “Palestine” is derived from Israel’s mortal enemy the Philistines of which King David finally eliminated in his reign as the second King of Israel. The Roman idea was to insult Judaism and remove a Jewish connection to their promised Home Land.

There is really no International Protocol that should prevent Israel from annexing Judea and Samaria for it was actually invaded and occupied by Jordan in 1948(ish). If Jordan had not gotten greedy they could have actually created another Arab State from the area of land that Jordan’s King Hussein dubbed the West Bank to distinguish it from the former Transjordan east of the Jordan River.

The biggest difficulty for an Israeli annexation today should not be the legality; rather the difficulty should be the demographics. Recent Jewish fear is that the Arab in Judea and Samaria have been breeding like rabbits and would make the Jews a minority in a Western Style Democratic nation. There have been new demographic studies that show that the Arab-Palestinians have inflated their population demographics significantly. Since the losing Arab nations of 1948 refused to matriculate Arab refugees into their own nations that was reinforced by the Arab League, the Arab created refugees began to live in a Stateless squalor. Ensuing losing invasions worsened the Arab conditions stranded in Judea and Samaria until 1967. That is the year that Israel spanked the invading Jordan and reacquired the land stolen by Jordan.

To give Jordan a little credit they accepted the most Arabs who called themselves Palestinians than all other Arab nations combined. This became a problem for Jordan for the Palestine Liberation Organization was created as an umbrella group of Arab and Islamic terrorists that became paramilitary troops within the Kingdom of Jordan. Much like Hezbollah is in present day Lebanon. The PLO began to indicate that the Yasir Arafat led paramilitary group was going to overthrow the Bedouin based army of King Hussein. This did not please the Jordanian King. Hussein took military action and booted the entire PLO armed infrastructure out of Jordan. This was like a civil war and Hussein prevailed. The PLO and Arafat next stop was southern Lebanon. To this very day though there is a significant amount of Arabs that would trace their lineage to the group that was told to flee by the 1948 invading armies.

Because of the demographics I am not necessarily pleased of an Israeli annexation of Judea and Samaria that would extend Israeli citizenship to a large group of Arabs that have brainwashed for over a half a century to hate Jews with a pathological passion. I favor the example of Turkey though with a less brutal execution.

Turkey forced Christian Greeks, Christian Armenians and Muslim Kurds to vacate out of Turkey or to difficult to live land along the Turkish border. I don’t know the clear picture of the Kurds; however for the Greeks it was violent, thieving and deadly to the tune of thousands. For the Armenians it was a genocide of over a million as they were marched out of Turkey proper and isolated near the now nation of Armenia. Turkish reason for all this people extrication: It was to ensure that Turkey retained Turkishness after the Ottoman Sultanate of Turkey lost WWI. The victors of WWI half-heartedly intended to fracture what was left of the Ottoman Empire by uniting the Greeks of Anatolia with their fellow Greeks of independent Greece which had gained independence from the Ottomans. The Greeks lost that war to the detriment of Anatolian (Turkey) Greeks who were marched out of Turkey. The Armenian fate was before the Ottoman WWI loss out of fear Armenians would rise up in revolt at the behest of European powers.

Since the West (including America) is going through an anti-Israel hatorade and a pro-Arab/pro-Muslim love affair, Israel would have nothing to lose giving Arabs that call themselves Palestinians a forced extrication to avoid having pathological hatred living within Israeli borders.

Israel might stand alone with such action; however I believe Americans would rise up in anger if invading Arab armies again used dislocated fellow Arabs as an excuse to wipe Israel off the map.

Those are my thoughts. Here are Ted Belman’s thoughts.

The two-state solution is dead. Long live what?

By Ted Belman, THE AMERICAN THINKER
Before delving into the question of what follows the death of the two-state solution we must get a certificate of death. This may prove to be more difficult than getting a certificate of live birth for President Obama.
Everyone prefers to kick a dead horse, so to speak, than to acknowledge it is dead. The Arabs were against the creation of Israel in the first place. They opposed the Palestine Mandate, The Partition Plan, The Declaration of Independence by Israel and Resolution 242. In 1968 they decided at the Khartoum Conference on the three “no’s”; no recognition, no negotiation and no peace.
Nevertheless both Egypt and Jordan broke with this policy and signed peace agreements with Israel. Anwar Sadat paid for this breach with his life.

Arafat had to accept Res 242 as the condition for entering the Oslo accords, He also had to agree to amend Fatah’s Charter which called for the destruction of Israel but never did amend it. The Hamas Charter also calls for the destruction of Israel. So the PA is only paying lip service to Res 242 and has no intention of complying with it,
The Arab League has yet to accept Res 242. Instead, at the Beirut Conference in 2002, it endorsed the Saudi Plan with certain amendments and called it the Arab Peace Initiative. Neither the Plan nor the Initiative were ever published officially but a communiqué was issued.
It demanded full withdrawal, a “just settlement” of the refugee problem and the creation of a “sovereign independent” state with East Jerusalem as its capital. In exchange, they would enter into a “peace agreement” and establish “normal relations” with Israel.
Whenever the Arabs talk about peace I am suspect as “peace” in Islam is only achieved when Islam is dominant. Besides Israel will never agree to all these demands.
In effect they substituted these parameters for the ones in Res 242. The US cooperated by including the Arab Peace Initiative in the Roadmap. Obama goes so far as to favour the Arab Initiative over Res 242.
By putting forward these demands, the Arabs have decided to wage war on Israel diplomatically. The peace process demanded by the Quartet (U.S., E.U., UN and Russia) buttressed by the Arab’s nebulous offer of peace, enables them to make demands on Israel and to force her compliance. It is not really about negotiating a settlement so much as it is about imposing a settlement. As times goes on Israel’s wiggle room gets smaller and smaller.
So, though an ultimate agreement is not achievable because Israel won’t agree to the Arab terms and the Arabs won’t compromise on them, the Arabs still want to continue the process. Abbas is spared the necessity of compromising and why should he. The Palestinians are doing well economically with the cooperation of Israel and the financial support of the US and the EU. Why look for trouble.
For the U.S., it’s the only game in town. They are not prepared to pack their bags and go home or to change the paradigm. Better to go through the motions.
The process is working to Israel’s disadvantage so why is Israel content to go along?
So long as the prospect of a two-state solution is out there, Israel does not have to resist calls for bi-national state or for citizenship for the Palestinians. In the meantime, the Palestinians have their autonomy and Israel has its security, insofar as Judea and Samaria are concerned, and an undivided Jerusalem.
While Israel would dearly love to sign a settlement deal to put an end to the deligitimation and demonization, the price is too high. The status quo is better.
But that doesn’t preclude putting facts on the ground. Israel must end the freeze and commence building in Jerusalem and the settlements. Aside from strengthening Israel’s hold on Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria, Israel is thereby putting great pressure on the Palestinians to compromise. Due to such construction, time would no longer on the side of the Palestinians.
That is why the Palestinians have suggested they would unilaterally declare a state or ask the UN to recognize a Palestinian state on all lands east of the ’67 borders. Were they to do so, it would be a game changer. Israel has said she wouldn’t allow it. It would end the peace process.
There is talk in Israel of extending Israeli law to the major settlements presently under occupation law. The Israelis living in them would dearly love the change and it would not affect the Arabs at all. Such a change would effectively make the settlements part of Israel.
Another factor that argues for the status quo is that Israel is facing a well-armed Hamas and Hezbollah and genocidal Iran who is about to get the bomb. In the next year there may well be war with Iran. Israel wants to have the US participate. This is not the time for dramatic concessions. Israel must know whether Iran will remain an enemy before determining what if any concessions to make.
In the meantime the mayor of Jerusalem Nir Barkat intends to implement Jerusalem’s ambitious Master Plan presently being finalized. The Plan aims to reverse the current trend whereby Arabs are moving into Jerusalem to be on the west side of the fence and Jews are moving out. The main reasons for this exodus are expensive housing, limited housing opportunities, scant employment opportunities, and relatively low salary levels.
The ultimate goal is to have a demographic balance in the city, Jews to Arabs of 60:40 by 2020. It is now 65:35. This is an urgent task for Israel exacerbated by the defacto construction freeze. Its implementation will not be without international and domestic opposition.
There are currently 300,000 Arabs living in Jerusalem. Reason enough to consider dividing the city. Even that will not be simple. The City of David, Mount of Olives and Rachel’s Tomb are all located in that part of Jerusalem east of the ’67 line where the Arabs live. Israelis would never agree to part with this part of their heritage.
Five years ago, I advocated annexing Judea and Samaria. Then I was odd man out. No longer.
Haaretz, Israel’s New York Times, just published, Endgame.
    “[..] Therefore, I say that we can look at another option: for Israel to apply its law to Judea and Samaria and grant citizenship to 1.5 million Palestinians. [..]
    “Once the sole preserve of the political margins, the approach is now being advocated by leading figures in Likud and among the settlers – people who are not necessarily considered extremists or oddballs. [..].
    “They talk about a process that will take between a decade and a generation to complete, at the end of which the Palestinians will enjoy full personal rights, but in a country whose symbols and spirit will remain Jewish. It is at this point that the one-state right wing diverges from the binational left. The right is not talking about a neutral “state of all its citizens” with no identity, nor about “Israstine” with a flag showing a crescent and a Shield of David. As envisaged by the right wing, one state still means a sovereign Jewish state, but in a more complex reality, and inspired by the vision of a democratic Jewish state without an occupation and without apartheid, without fences and separations.”
Just think; no division of Jerusalem, no transfer of Jews, no border dispute, no international forces,, no air-rights dispute, no water dispute and no right of return. The challenge for Israel will be to avoid civil unrest. She succeeded in Israel. She will succeed in the expanded Israel.
Long live the democratic Jewish one-state solution.


Ibish, why do you keep talking about what the Israelis will accept?

It is frequently asked, although rarely directly to my face, ?why does Ibish always talk/only seem to care (some version of that) about what Jewish Israelis will accept rather than what Palestinians want?? This question was recently repeated in a tweet, although not, as usual, directly addressed to me. Nonetheless, I do want to answer it because this confusion lies at the heart of a gulf of misunderstanding between the analyses I have been developing in recent years and much conventional wisdom among Arab-Americans and other pro-Palestinian groups. I think it defines a sustained surprise, and even bewilderment, that someone with such a strong, unequivocal and extremely public record of pro-Palestinian advocacy would raise the questions and points that I have been making in recent years. I think it also is a question that gets to the heart of the growing distance between idealistic activists who think largely in abstract, and often even theoretical, terms and those of us who are trying to find a solution to the occupation as a practical and more importantly political problem in the real world based on the actual array of forces that can produce outcomes. It is the gap between the politics, or perhaps I should say faux-politics, of emotion and longing versus the real politics of, to employ a shopworn but nonetheless indispensable cliché, the art of the possible.
First of all, the whole accusation is a misrepresentation of the thrust of my work over the past few years. I mainly, in fact, talk about what the Palestinians want and need, and especially about their national and diplomatic strategies, when I write about the conflict. My whole book about the one-state agenda was mainly about what Palestinians minimally need to accomplish for their national goals to be realized, and why. Just like the rest of the overwhelming majority of my work, it was not primarily about what the Israelis want or need, although it did frequently touch upon the subject, and with good reason. Because it seems to confuse so many people, I want to try to explain why I do this.
Let’s begin with some very simple axioms: 1) there is no military victory available to either Israel or the Palestinians to resolve this conflict; 2) if the conflict is to be resolved, it must therefore be resolved by an agreement; 3) this is therefore the only way to end the occupation and achieve Palestinian national independence; 4) the only alternative to an agreement that ends the occupation and the conflict is continued occupation and conflict. A fifth probability, that does not rise to the level of an axiom but that comes extremely, disturbingly, close, is that this continued conflict will almost certainly become increasingly religious, bitter, violent and intractable, and is likely to morph from an ethnic struggle over land and power to a religious holy war over God’s will and sacred spaces. I take these four points as axiomatic and virtually self-evident as I see no arguments capable of contradicting any of them. If anybody has any such ideas that are not fanciful and actually take into consideration the array of forces (social, economic, political and military) that produce real political outcomes in the real world, please forward them to the Ibishblog immediately as they will be an original contribution and possibly a breakthrough in thinking on the conflict. I’m not holding my breath.
One usually gets, in response to some version of these four axioms, fanciful alternative scenarios that I have often described as ?science fiction? because they do not take into consideration the forces that produce outcomes I keep referring to. The consolidation of a greater Israel, the victory of an Islamic state from the river to the sea, the democratic, South Africa style one-state solution, the so-called Jordanian option, various notions of Israeli-Palestinian Confederation and regional EU-like ?unions of the children of Abraham? or some such folderol, are all examples of fanciful scenarios that fail at the most fundamental level because in each and every case at least one of the parties that would have to accept such an outcome cannot plausibly be imagined as accepting it. As long as one party central to an outcome will neither accept such an outcome nor can be plausibly militarily forced to accept it, we can say with a great deal of confidence that such an outcome is extremely unlikely to the point not being worth serious consideration.
The latest example of this is the right wing and settler version of the ?one-state solution? being proposed by some extremist Israelis in which Israel would annex all of the West Bank, including Jerusalem, but not Gaza, adding about 1.5 million new Palestinian citizens to Israel, but keeping their political rights in various forms of check to ensure the state remains ?Jewish? and Israel rather than anything else. This is the subject of a feature article in this weekend’s version of Ha’aretz. The idea that this would end the Palestinian national struggle and the conflict because West Bank Palestinians would be delighted for the occupation to become permanent and to receive third or fourth class Israeli ?citizenship? over time, of course while being colonized and repressed more ardently than ever, and that the rest of the Palestinians don’t count and the national movement would simply collapse is a wonderful example of political ?science fiction.? From a serious point of view, we needn’t bother with it, but one is unfortunately obliged to take the time to debunk the idea lest sensible people be seduced by it any way.
In considering the range of possible outcomes and strategies for ending the occupation and the conflict, as I’m trying to explain, one must take the minimal interests and bottom line perspectives of all the central parties, especially Palestinians and Jewish Israelis, into profound consideration. It is a ubiquitous and uniting feature of all fanciful outcomes that they strikingly, blindingly, fail to do so, instead privileging one set of national imperatives over all the others, at the expense of remaining within the realm of the possible. Serious observers, and especially those who seriously want to contribute real ideas that can really make things better and, hopefully, lead ultimately to real solutions, have no practical or rational alternative but to take the perspectives of all the parties involved very seriously on their own terms and not imagine that they can be wished away or magically overcome by some secret formula for sudden success.
This means that the central failure and the central delusion of the right wing Israelis promoting the preposterous version of the “one-state solution” I outlined above is that their so-called “plan” is highly sensitive to Israeli concerns and interests about control of historically and religiously emotive land in the West Bank but fails utterly to take into consideration the minimal requirements of the Palestinian national movement. It somehow assumes that West Bank Palestinians will be mollified enough by some limited and highly attenuated Israeli ?citizenship? that they will therefore become Israeli in much the same way that the Palestinian citizens of Israel have become since 1948. One can only nurse such an assumption if it remains implicit and unstated since to ask the question of whether that would happen or not is to answer it, quite firmly, in the negative. I think there’s almost no doubt whatsoever that under such circumstances many, if not most, Palestinians in the West Bank would refuse Israeli citizenship in the way that most Jerusalem residents have, and refuse to accept the permanent consolidation of the occupation and canceling of their entire national project. It would be seen as, and in practice probably look a lot like, the ?East Jerusalem-ization” of the entire West Bank – hardly an acceptable prospect from a Palestinian point of view. This is not to mention the reaction of the Palestinians in Gaza, the Palestinian citizens of Israel, the refugees, the Arab world, particularly states ? Egypt and Jordan ? with diplomatic relations and peace treaties with Israel (which such a move would violate), or the international community which has a strong consensus in favor of ending the occupation and a large body of international law holding that Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories in exchange for peace, not unilaterally annex territory seized during warfare.
I think this most recent example illustrates pretty well what happens when one party proceeds based entirely on its own needs and assumptions, disregarding everybody else including the other main protagonist, regional actors and the international community, all of which will play a major factor in determining the plausibility of any outcome. Even when that party believes itself to be making every effort to be fair and reasonable and just, based on the principle of extending democratic enfranchisement within a given territory to ?the enemy population? or at least “the other side,” such failures produce proposals that look eminently reasonable from one blinkered, tunnel-vision and purely theoretical outlook but which seem absurd, not only to the other side, but to all informed observers who take the needs of all parties seriously in the consideration of the plausibility of outcomes. This, in fine, is why when various scenarios for ending the conflict are brought forward, especially the increasingly popular one-state agenda, one of the factors I look at carefully every time is the likely response of the overwhelming majority of Jewish Israelis. We’ve just seen a good example of what happens when Jewish Israelis try to think outside the box without considering the response of the overwhelming majority of Palestinians. I think it’s extremely important, if one is going to think seriously about the problem, rather than use politics as psychotherapy, to avoid such an obvious and dangerous pitfall.
I think about what Jewish Israelis will accept or not accept because if I don’t then I’m not thinking politically at all. I’m indulging in the ?science fiction? version of politics that is deliberately pleasing and fanciful but disconnected from fundamental realities that must always be taken into consideration. Jewish Israelis, and indeed the State of Israel, exist. They have power, considerable military means, economic success of a kind, technological expertise, and most importantly international support at a very significant level. I think most pro-Palestinian advocates don’t understand how much more influence Israel and the pro-Israeli groups have developed in Washington even over the past five years and how profoundly deeper the military and intelligence links have become. In fact, it’s clear they both don’t know about this or understand its significance. On its own, Israel is a formidable force. When placed in the context of the international forces committed to its continuation, but not its occupation, it is even more formidable. It is not going anywhere. It is not a house of cards on the verge of collapse. It is unlikely to prove a crusader state in waiting, to be driven away sometime in the next 200 years (although honestly, who cares what happens in 200 years?). It is not going to be brought to its knees by a boycott. It is a reality, a national reality, that has to be taken into consideration as seriously as possible by anyone genuinely trying to think through the Palestinian national strategy and the goal of ending the occupation (or any other goal for that matter). Some people don’t think about this because it is too painful. Some, because it disrupts their science fiction stories. Some, because they just don’t understand the basic facts. These are all unacceptable excuses for such a fundamental error.
The same precisely applies to the Israelis and pro-Israel types who do not think clearly and seriously about the Palestinians as a people and a national movement, indeed a nation, that cannot be defeated or dismissed but must be dealt with either through agreement or through ongoing, irresolvable conflict. The Palestinians exist. They have their own forms of power, sometimes the power of the weak perhaps, but their power cannot be ignored. Some of these forms of Palestinian power are their demographic reality, their undeniable history, the will of their national movement, strong and growing international support for their independence (it is, in fact, really US policy for there to be a state of Palestine), increasing global disgust with the nature and the reality of the occupation and impatience with Israel’s refusal to accept that the occupation must end. Then there is the simple fact that if the Israelis do not agree with the secular nationalists of the PLO who wish to live side-by-side in peace and security in two separate, independent states, they will almost certainly end up dealing with bearded Islamist fanatics, and will probably by that stage be themselves led by their own bearded Jewish fundamentalist fanatics as well. The Israelis must know, as must the Americans and others, that they will play a significant role in deciding which Palestinians they will have to deal with over the long run. But the bottom line is the Palestinians are not going anywhere, they are not going to be defeated, they are not going to give up and abandon their national movement, and, in the end, they are going to continue to fight, in one way or another, for their dignity and bottom-line national rights.
So, when we talk about any of the fanciful, ?science fiction,? alternative outcomes other than a negotiated end of the occupation and the conflict, it is incumbent upon those of us who understand this simple and all important principle to remind others on our side about the fundamental reality and the basic, bottom line national interests of the other party that are almost certainly being ignored in these scenarios. I’m sure that there are plenty of people in Israel who have or will point out to the right-wingers pushing their new, preposterous, version of a ?one-state solution? for the West Bank only, and with highly attenuated fourth class citizenship for Palestinians there, that they are talking nonsense because the other side will not accept any such arrangement and the conflict will therefore continue in one way or another and probably intensify and deteriorate (as it continuously has since the 1930s). Obviously it’s up to all of us to keep each other honest and to raise the most obvious and fundamental questions about what we are all proposing.
For those of us who advocate a two state solution and an end to the occupation, there are very serious challenges such as the existing settlements, ongoing settlement construction, settler and pro-settler ideology, Palestinian divisions and many other major problems and concerns that would have to be overcome in order to achieve this outcome. Neither I nor any serious advocate of ending the occupation downplays these serious challenges. But what we do say is that such an outcome is still possible because it, alone, meets the minimum national requirements of both parties and is urgently required by the international community and most regional actors. There is no doubt there are huge forces pushing against it, including on the ground, although Palestinian state building efforts (however nascent and fledgling they clearly are) are an interesting new push-back on the same ground, but there are also huge forces pushing and militating for it. I’ve never maintained it was the likely outcome, only a genuinely plausible and really imaginable one, one that does in fact correspond to the array of forces that can produce outcomes. But what I’ve also maintained is that without it, as is becoming increasingly clear, the only real alternative is increased occupation, dressed up in whatever new costumes Israel decides to force on it, and therefore, over the long run, increased conflict which will almost certainly become increasingly religious, violent and intractable. As far as I can tell, in all seriousness, those are the only two outcomes the array of existing forces can really produce. The fact that a two state agreement is the less likely of the two is no excuse for not preferring it to the gruesome, unspeakable alternative, and working, with all determination and seriousness of purpose, to make sure that it happens in spite of the obstacles.

What to make of Israel’s admission that the West Bank lies outside of its borders?

An Ibishblog reader asks: "The Jerusalem Post reported: ‘Israel argued this week that a major human rights treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, did not apply to its treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, because those areas were outside the country’s national boundaries.’ This is the first time I’ve heard Israel define the Occupied Territories as "outside" its national boundaries. Is this indeed the first time Israel has so clearly made this statement that defined the West Bank and Gaza outside its boundaries? Obviously the UN HRC has thrown this argument out, but putting human rights aside for a moment, how can Israel so clearly admit the Territories are outside its national boundaries yet still have an argument that justifies the legality of the settlements? I must be incorrect in my assessment of the weight of this statement as I seem to be the only one noticing it."
Well, the reader is certainly not the only one who noticed this. This is an unusual, although hardly unprecedented, admission from the Israelis, and it comes in a very interesting context. Israel’s position regarding the applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention (under which the settlements are clearly illegal) to the occupied territories has traditionally been that the territories are not occupied but “disputed,” because there was no valid sovereign before the 1967 war and other specious arguments, and that therefore the territories are not occupied in spite of a veritable mountain of UN Security Council resolutions beginning with 242 in 1967 holding that they are. If the territories are not occupied, then the Geneva Convention does not apply, Israel argues. However, it’s going to be very difficult to square that in the long run with an apparently contradictory argument about the inapplicability of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights based on the West Bank lying outside the borders of Israel.
Logic would dictate that even the Israelis would have to pick one perspective: either these areas are inside Israel’s boundaries and therefore the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights applies (no doubt it applies anyway, I’m just proceeding on the “logic” they submitted to the UN) or they are not inside Israel’s boundaries and therefore the Geneva Convention applies. Indeed, the UN Security Council has ruled many times that the Geneva Convention does of course apply to the occupied territories, as, no doubt, does the Covenant. To argue that neither applies is typical of the Israeli approach to the occupied territories, placing it in a sui generis category completely outside the bounds of established international legality and normal dictates of political logic. As I’ve written elsewhere, what the Israelis essentially have established is a virtual Israel that exists wherever a settler happens to be and an unresolved, ambiguous occupation everywhere else in the occupied territories.
The bottom line is that there is an international arbiter of such questions that transforms them from matters of opinion into those of legal and political facts: the UN Security Council, which has made its view that these territories are under foreign military occupation very clear on countless occasions since 1967. If there is a dispute, it is a dispute between Israel and everybody else, beginning with the Security Council, not between Israel and the Palestinians or the Arabs. It’s a bit like an argument in which one person says the sky looks green and everybody else says the sky looks blue: that does not constitute a legitimate dispute, it constitutes one party trying to have things its own way in a manner nobody else accepts. This is particularly true when there is an established arbiter for such matters, as there is in this case, and the arbiter has made its position crystal clear. Now the Israelis have formally agreed that West Bank lies outside of its international boundaries, it should plainly be held to that. This argument should be remembered and repeated into the foreseeable future, in case they forget they made it.
Moreover, the Israeli position regarding its boundaries requires some serious interrogation, and it’s not an exaggeration to say that Israel may be the only member state of the United Nations without clear and declared boundaries (all the other candidates for such a category are much less dramatic examples, if they qualify at all). For example, Israel would certainly claim, on the basis of its virtual annexation of occupied East Jerusalem (what they actually did was extend Israeli civil law to all of what Israel defines as “municipal Jerusalem” but not a formal annexation as such), which was flatly and indeed angrily rejected by the UN Security Council in several resolutions at the time, that Jerusalem is within Israel’s international boundaries.
Indeed, Security Council Resolution 476 (June 30, 1980) reaffirmed, “the overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.” So the Security Council felt that the occupation was prolonged a full 30 years ago, “only” 13 years after it began, and was thoughtful enough to reiterate that Israel must end its occupation of Jerusalem. This was needed because ever since the adoption of 242, Israelis have been arguing that the absence of the definite article “the” in the cause “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” somehow meant that Israel could keep hold of some of the occupied territories outside the context of an agreement that it can do so. This is always a very dubious argument because the Security Council opened 242 by “Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.” The idea that the missing definite article (not missing in the French text of the resolution, mind you) invalidates the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war is admirable from the perspective of lawyering, but logical and legal nonsense. Either it is, as a rule, inadmissible or it may, in some cases, be admissible. But of course missing definite articles do not turn what is flatly stated to be an inadmissible process into an admissible one. Of course the territory most specifically in question in terms of Israel’s insistence that it unilaterally retain portions of what it conquered in 1967 is occupied East Jerusalem, which is what gives Resolution 476 its special significance: it makes very clear that the Security Council regards Jerusalem as part of the territories that are occupied and from which Israel must withdraw.
To return to the admission/claim made before the United Nations last week, as I say it’s certainly not unique but it is very rare. Perhaps an even more interesting version of this same highly unusual acknowledgment of reality came a few weeks ago when the Israeli military, which effectively and under Israeli regulations controls the occupied territories, ruled that army decisions regarding settlers and settlements need to be tested primarily against international law and not Israel’s basic law. This extremely unusual ruling is a deviation from the general Israeli practice that extends the protections of Israeli citizenship and basic law to the settlers. It was designed to give the military more leeway in dealing with settlers, especially the extremists in question who were being banned from most of the West Bank. The question, as I understand it, is still being adjudicated in the Israeli appellate system, as the settlers claim that the IDF must be subject to Israeli law when dealing with Israelis in the occupied territories (but not Palestinians). But the fact that the military would point international law rather than Israeli law as the guiding principle in dealing with settlers and settlements, even when it’s manifestly in an effort to bolster its own leverage with other Israelis, is another very significant gesture in a similar direction.
In the final analysis, whatever the Israeli position might be it has no choice but to negotiate the boundaries of a Palestinian state or continue the occupation indefinitely with a kind of grim consequences I keep writing about. There are presently three main recognized dangers to Israel in official and quasi-official Israeli discourse: Iran and its nuclear program, delegitimization, and the lack of peace with the Palestinians. It depends a great deal who you’re listening to which of the three of these problems is considered the most grave. PM Netanyahu and many other officials are obsessed with the question of Iran, regarding everything else as comparatively irrelevant. Many Israeli diplomats, analysts and others are even more concerned about what they call "delegitimization," by which they tend to mean an illogical potpourri of genuine efforts to deny and challenge the legitimacy of the Israeli state with an effort to replacing it with some other kind of state, legal challenges to Israel and Israeli officials that may or may not have factual and political merit depending on the case, and completely legitimate Palestinian critiques of and actions against abusive occupation policies and other, not only legitimate but necessary, critiques of Israeli excesses. Others, including DM Ehud Barak, are blunt in their view that neither of these two problems is as serious as the problems posed by the ongoing occupation and the lack of a peace agreement with the Palestinians, which they say has to be the utmost strategic priority for any Israeli government.
Obviously I think the third opinion plainly is most convincing even from a strictly Israeli perspective, if nothing else because the occupation provides Iran with its excuse to be critical of and confrontational with Israel and to support clients that are directly antagonistic to it, and because it is mainly the occupation that fuels almost everything regarded as “delegitimization.” Ironically, those most concerned with delegitimization tend to also be those supporting the very policies that lead to that very phenomenon, whether in any given case it deserves the term “delegitimization” or not. In other words, the occupation remains at the heart of all of the most severe strategic challenges Israel faces, and this is only likely to intensify insofar as it refuses to seriously discuss ending it on reasonable terms. Continuously reminding Israel of its now formally stated position that the West Bank lies outside of its borders will be doing it quite a significant favor.

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